Is Hegemony in the South Pacific possible? by Waqanivala, Elisapeci
    
 
 
1 | P a g e  
  
“Is Hegemony in the South Pacific possible?” 
 
By 
 
Elisapeci Samanunu Waqanivala 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the Victoria University of Wellington in fulfilment of the 
requirement for the degree of Master in Strategic Studies. 
 
Victoria University of Wellington 
2015 
Edited version 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
2 | P a g e  
  
Abstract 
Hegemony is a concept associated with ‘superordinate’ powers equated to a sovereign 
state that has amassed great wealth and prowess. It is instrumental in developing 
institutions and defines the ‘rules of the game’. This paper explores the theory, that to 
be a hegemon in the region, a super-powerful state requires more than controlling 
inherent material capabilities. The rule of force and ideological thinking are now 
inadequate to keep a super state as the dominant or hegemonic power. There are 
distinct shifts of power dynamics from a realist perspective which includes John 
Mearsheimer’s “hard” and “latent power” to Evelyn Goh’s ideational thinking and the 
“cultural and social” components. China-US feature strongly in this paper. It will 
explore if hegemony is possible in the South Pacific Region (SPR). The region covers 
a large blue ocean space that has a number of small Pacific Island sovereign states 
and New Zealand and Australia. Geographically, the region has three distinct sub-
regions namely, Melanesia, Polynesia, Micronesia. It is within these sub-region that 
‘ordering’ of states occur with New Zealand, Australia and Papua New Guinea 
occupying larger landmasses and having bigger populations than the smaller island 
states. The emergence of China with its foreign policy interests, ‘soft power’ and blue 
ocean naval strategy into the SPR has attracted attention from the traditional powers 
inside and outside the region. In response, US, a superpower identified as the 
hegemon in the Pacific region, post colonization era during the 20th and the early 21st 
century, earning its name as ‘Pacific Theatre or The American Lake’, is re-adjusting 
its strategy to counter China’s interest. An analysis based on the ranking table with 
specific parameters will assist in determining which of the powers, in this instance, US 
and China will occupy the top of the rank. Even so it may not be adequate to claim 
hegemonic status in the region. This paper agrees that ‘hegemony’ is specific to the 
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region of its interest. Power is measured in terms of its relative gains.  The primary 
criteria in the ranking table will measure Aid given by donor countries to Pacific Islands. 
Although New Zealand and Australia are within the region they are ranked as donor 
states rather than recipients like island states in the sub-region. 
Key words: South Pacific, Islands, New Zealand, Australia, United States, China, 
hegemony, power, hierarchy, strategy, diplomacy 
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1.0   Introduction 
 
“I am always amused when people come to the islands and talk about politics as if this 
was something new or something we had to learn. Politics themselves are as old as 
man and well known in the islands”, (RatuMara, 1969)  
 
Hegemony or “hegemonia…. and ‘Ήγεμωv, [or] hegemon”, are Greek words 
signifying, “supreme command or supremacy”, (Wilkinson, 2008, p. 120). The term 
was used in “Homer’s Iliad .hegemonia..[II.2]”, which indicated, “the hegemony or 
sovereignty of one state over number of subordinates, as of Athens in Attica [or]…the 
hegemony of Greece”, (Wilkinson, 2008, pp. 120-122), as was the case with Sparta 
and Athens during the “Peloponnesian war (404 BC)”, (Wilkinson, 2008, p. 120). The 
term literally means the “dominant and oppressive status of one element in the system 
over the others”, (Wilkinson, 2008).  Wilkinson indicated, “the Pelopponn[esian] war 
was a struggle for this hegemony", (Wilkinson, 2008, pp. 120-122). 
 
In the early 20th century, the theory of hegemony, was again referred to by Antonio 
Gramsci (1891-1937), an Italian Marxist theorist, (Foragacs, David, n.d.). Based on 
Gramsci’s writings in his notebooks ‘hegemony’ centres on “cultural and ideological 
means”, (Foragacs, David, n.d.). In his view, the dominant power or the ruling class 
preserve their dominance over subordinate classes, (Foragacs, David, n.d.). 
Hegemony is a form of grand strategy. 
 
The Greek version as noted by Wilkinson views hegemony as “supremacy or 
sovereignty of one state “over number of subordinates”.  Gramsci, on the other hand 
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reaffirms the notion that hegemony theory is premised on the fact that ideas form an 
integral dimension of how man is governed, and it is not just by the use of force.  
 
In the 21st century, to be a regional power, a state needs to fulfil specific criteria in 
order to become a hegemon. State powers in a region are varied, be it superpower, 
middle power or minor power. Each operates independently with its own sovereignty 
and possess powers and privilege. A collection of states divided by land borders, such 
as European Union (EU) which is a new paradigm as a supranational entity that tests 
the structure and sovereignty of its member states. The South Pacific Region (SPR) 
is structured differently and comprises island states, New Zealand (NZ) and Australia 
which are separated by ocean borders.  
 
Formation of alliances occurs at the state level as ‘units’ and the dominant or 
hegemonic state often dictates these alliances. These states possess powers and 
privileges. There is an endless rivalry between great powers. However, the unipolar 
arrangement has become more than bi-polar as states are shifting to a multi-polar 
arrangement. This means structural changes from traditional state and ongoing 
transformation for states to adapt to new ideas and pressures within the region or even 
globalization.  
 
This paper will argue that the core concept of power, structure and hegemony are 
interlinked and to be a dominant power in the region, a state is required to also focus 
on the ‘social and cultural’ component as it filtrates the three distinct levels and 
interacts with states to effect “international outcomes”, (Waltz, 1988) . It will attempt to 
unpack the three concepts of power, structure and hegemony by analysing the IR 
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realism approach. It will also touch on structural realism. Using the above argument, 
this paper will explore and identify who is the dominant state or hegemony in the SPR. 
To be a hegemon in a region, a ‘superordinate’ state requires more than controlling 
inherent material capabilities. The use of force and ideological thinking are inadequate 
to keep a super state as the dominant power. There is a distinct shift of power 
dynamics from a realist perspective involving “hard and “latent power”, (Bates, 1975) 
and ideological perspective to one that includes “cultural and social”, (Goh, 2008) The 
paper reinforces Goh’s thinking that hegemony has a social component that is crucial 
rather than just the material capability that Mearsheimer suggests.  Importantly, it will 
discuss and examine the approaches by China and United States to assess the level 
of their interests and their role in the SPR.  
 
Notably, the first quarter of the 21st Century has witnessed changes to state power 
competition within the region and internationally.  This indicates a shift and weakened 
collective regulatory powers that once controlled orders in specific regions. The period 
covered in this paper will be post 1945 through to pre and post-Cold War eras when 
the US was the acknowledged superpower in the region. 
 
Since the 1990s, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) claiming to be a developing 
nation has been deepening its foreign engagement in the SPR. As widely publicized, 
PRC aims to further its foreign policy interests and blue ocean maritime naval strategy 
in the region. During this period, PRC has gained a strong foothold in the SPR and 
has signed agreements with fourteen Pacific Island sovereign states in the sub-region 
as it promotes its ‘soft power or cheque book diplomacy’. It has been argued that 
PRC’s interest in SPR has been more to counter Taiwan’s influence in the region. 
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Though, this is a moot point. In response to PRC increasing influence, the US, in 2007, 
under President Obama administration launched its ‘Pivot to Asia-Pacific’. Notably, 
Professor Robert Ayson asserted that Australia is “one of Washington’s leading allies 
in Asia-Pacific” (Ayson, 2012, p. 338). New Zealand, on the other hand, as Ayson 
indicated, “is unable and unwilling to match the intensity of its neighbour’s relationship 
with leading power”, (Ayson, 2012, p. 338).   
 
This paper will has five parts. The first will give a brief outline of how I will approach 
the question of hegemony in SPR. The second part will define the concept of 
‘hegemon’.  It will cite both the U.S. and China throughout as examples of superpowers 
and the possibility of one being a regional hegemon. In addition it will also evaluate 
the distinction between hegemony and the concept of ‘power’ drawing on relevant 
sources from research in IR literature on the topic of hegemon and power which forms 
the basis of this paper. In addition it will provide brief geographical and relevant 
historical information on the region. The third part will discuss the different ways of 
acting as ‘hegemon’. The paper will analyse and critically examine who may have been 
or could be a hegemon in the SPR. Within this it will deliberate on the colonial powers 
and the U.S. from the 1940s to today. New Zealand (NZ), Australia and China’s role 
in the region will also be featured. 
 
It will also scrutinise the relevance of the topic of hegemony and its significance to the 
geographical location of the SPR. The fourth part will evaluate whether ‘hegemony’ is 
possible in the SPR. To this end, I will try to evaluate and assess the extent of this 
possibility of the powerful states that have influence in the region and find a clear 
distinction between the power concentration or distribution and the emphasis between 
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the capabilities or means as opposed to the outcomes or effects. This aspect will be 
fully explored using the ranking tables has been compiled in detail to evaluate the 
situation of the great powers operating in the region. 
  
The concluding part will assert that whilst hegemon is possible in the SPR, neither the 
US nor China are ranked as the hegemon in the region. There are four distinct powers 
in the SPR namely, China, the US, Australia and NZ. The four states contribute 
significantly in various ways towards development in the region, be it through aid, 
security or economics. Using aid as the primary measure, Australia is the largest donor 
in aid, China as second, NZ as third and US fourth. This is based on the table ranking. 
However, Australia, unlike China has yet to sign diplomatic ties with fourteen of the 
Pacific Island states and neither has US. Though it is observed PRC, as argued by 
some has pursued its interest in the SPR to compete more with Taiwan than the US. 
This is a moot point.  Nevertheless, the US still ranks as the top in material wealth and 
defense capabilities.  Whilst Australia ranked as the top donor and China as second 
gives an indication that these are the two major powers in the region based on Aid. 
Other factors that contribute to being a superpower in the region involves deeper 
interactions and involvement in several layers be it structural or economically. Material 
capability does contribute however, this focus appears to have now shifted.  
 
    1.1 Literatures on the Topic of Hegemon in SPR 
There are a few scholarly articles written on hegemony in the SPR by experts such 
as; Steven Ratuva, Jian Yang and others. Both Ratuva and Yang are cited in this 
paper. Ratuva in his journal article written for Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies, had 
used the concept of hegemony in his text to denote that both the US and PRC were 
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both hegemony in the SPR. A quick count on the use of the term hegemon in Ratuva’s 
article only showed, he used the word ‘hegemony’, approximately four times.  In 
contrast, Yang in his Pacific Review article, titled “China in the South Pacific: hegemon 
on the horizon”, the title itself speaks to readers or those researching the concept 
hegemon. In Yang’s perspective, there is an element of competition between the 
powers in the region, particularly between US and PRC. Both articles cover the 
possibility of competition between the two powers with the SPR as a target for a ‘new 
Cold War theatre.   
 
 
2.0   What is Hegemony?  
The concept ‘hegemony’ gives the notion of an all dominant nation state that possess 
great power and is even more dominant than an ordinary super-power and occupies 
the very top position in the hierarchy of states. As a case in point, hegemon, as claimed 
in a statement by Steven W. Mosher, during his presentation to the US House of 
Representatives showed that the US only became aware of this  concept “during 
Henry Kissinger’s secret visit to Beijing in 1971”, (Mosher, n.d, p. 1). According to 
Mosher, “it was the Chinese translator’s use of this unfamiliar English word [that] sent 
the American scrambling for their dictionaries”, (Mosher, n.d, p. 1). Mosher claims, it 
was at this point that the US discovered the meaning of “hegemony” which he indicated 
to mean “a single pole or axis of power” which meant “leadership or predominant 
influence by one state over others”, (Mosher, n.d). 
  
The term hegemony has embedded in it, political and economic might with strong 
military and defence capabilities. Gilpin alerts us to “Thucydides conception of 
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international relations” and the “structure of the system or distribution of power among 
the states can be stable or unstable”, (Gilpin, 1988, p. 592). The “stable system [is one 
that] has unequivocal hierarchy of power and an unchallenged dominant or hegemonic 
power”, (Gilpin, 1988, p. 592). Alternatively, for an “unstable system” Gilpin indicates, 
it relates to “economic, technological, and other changes” that erode “the international 
hierarchy” thus challenging “the position of the hegemonic state”, (Gilpin, 1988, p. 
592).  
 
The “structure of the international system”, comprises the “hierarchy of power and 
relations amongst states in the system”, (Gilpin, 1988, p. 592). The hypothesis of 
hegemony involves intricate details of layered interactions at various levels within this 
system of structures from the super power, middle power down to the minor power 
and vice versa within a region as well as external to the region. Interestingly, Gilpin 
remarks, in the chaos of the international structure and at the state level “statesmen 
make decisions and respond to the decisions of others action-reaction process” which 
he argues impact on state’s foreign policies thus affecting diplomatic relationship, 
(Gilpin, 1988, p. 592).  
 
The outcome of these diplomatic interaction, Gilpin (1988, p.593), says, can trigger 
“situations in which statesmen deliberately provoke a [hegemonic] war [as Thucydides 
called it] or lose control over events”.  Such are the dynamics of international relations 
propelled by the variance in growth of powers amongst states. Fundamental to these 
evolutionary changes within state actors, as noted by Gilpin, are human factors. These 
he labels as “interest, pride, fear” to which “they always seek to increase their wealth 
and power until other humans, driven by like passions, try to stop them”, (Gilpin, 1988, 
    
 
 
12 | P a g e  
  
p. 593).    Using “great powers” such as the United States (US) and China, as 
“constituting a system” similar to Thucydides’ thought of “Sparta and Athens”, (Gilpin, 
1988, p. 595) it appears the scene is set.  
 
In furthering Thucydides’ thinking, Gilpin asserts, the “distribution of power among 
states” is what forms the “structure of the system” and it is the “hierarchy of power 
among these states” that helps “define and maintain the system and determine the 
relative prestige of states, their spheres of influence, and their political relations”, 
(Gilpin, 1988, pp. 595-6). It is therefore the “hierarchy of power” interlinked with 
relevant components are what “gave order and stability to the system”, (Gilpin, 1988, 
p. 596).  
 
Interestingly, Wilkinson, citing Homer, had indicated that ‘hegemonia’ literally means 
the dominant and oppressive position of a state in the system above all others.  
Hegemony concept is useful in advancing one’s knowledge to appreciate the power 
interactions within international relations. It is important to note a crucial point from 
Antonio Gramsci who affirmed, consent is a central aspect of understanding the 
concept of hegemony and that power is not reliant on force. With his Marxist view, 
Gramsci implied that hegemony epitomized the rank of the most powerful country in 
the international system or within a specific region, as Mearsheimer claimed. As a 
point of interest, Robert Cox had closely examined Gramsci’s “perception of 
hegemony” who broadened his definition of the state.to include “the underpinnings of 
the political structure in civil society ….historical terms – the church, the educational 
system, the press, all the institutions which helped create in people certain modes of 
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behaviour and expectations consistent with the hegemonic social order”, (Cox, 1994, 
p. 51). 
 
“Power hierarchies”, (Nolte, 2010, p. 881), are an integral component of the concept 
of hegemony, which sees powerful states in competition with each other in order to 
become a supreme power in international politics. Notably, the stability of the system 
within the hierarchy of states is influenced by the position of the great powers. Smaller 
powers can change their positions up or down the hierarchy and have minimal effect 
on “the stability of the system”, (Gilpin, 1988, p. 596). To earn the hegemon status, 
contending powers must first become a “regional power”, (Nolte, 2010, p. 881). To this 
end, Nolte asserts, “Although the content of regional power is frequently used in 
International Relations (IR) literature, there is no consensus regarding defining 
characteristics of a regional power”, (Nolte, 2010, p. 881). IR text do have a common 
view that to be a regional hegemon a state must not only have extended its powers 
within the region and be a key player in several layers of the structures but be very 
powerful in its own standing. Reference is also made to the ranking table that will be 
presented in this paper to figure out if regional hegemony is possible or not possible, 
in the SPR. 
 
It is crucial to also examine IR theories which contain selected source to support our 
knowledge of power relations and state’s security measures. Central to these theories 
are three significant concept of power, structure and hegemony. One of the major IR 
approach is that of realism which underscores the role of nation-states. From a 
“structural realism”, (Waltz, 1988, p. 618), perspectives, the international system 
indicates, “the essential structural quality of the system is anarchy – the absence of a 
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central monopoly of legitimate force”. According to Waltz, neorealism maintain that 
“effects of structure are added to the unit-level” account of “traditional realism”, (Waltz, 
1988, pp. 617-618).  Waltz then alerts us to “how structures affect actions and 
outcomes”, (Waltz, 1988, p. 617). He further added that neorealism rebuffs the idea 
“that man’s innate lust for power constitute sufficient cause of war in the absence of 
any other”.  
 
Interestingly, in Waltz’s analysis, using the “logic of international politics“, he iterates 
that it is the interactions between “unit level” and presumably “at the level of structure” 
that brings about “international” result, (Waltz, 1988, p. 618). He further indicated that 
“structural realism presents a systemic portrait of international politics depicting 
component units according to the manner of their arrangement”, (Waltz, 1988, p. 618). 
Here a notion is formed that “states are cast as unitary actors wanting at least to 
survive” and are viewed as an integral part of the system, (Waltz, 1988, p. 618).  The 
formation of foreign policy in Waltz scrutiny occurs around this point as he believes 
the creation of “foreign policy” should be concurrent to when “constructing a theory of 
international politics”, (Waltz, 1988, p. 618). He asserted that “a system theory of 
international politics deals with forces at the international level, and not at the national 
level”, (Waltz, 1988, p. 618). The process Waltz articulates illustrates that power 
struggle forms the core of international relations and to a realist this is when nation 
states maximize their interests. The structure as indicated in Waltz’s explanation is 
military power and cooperation. This is where it becomes difficult as a dominant state 
or hegemony in a region can assume control and turn the power balance to its 
advantage. In Waltz’s view, based on realist approach, it is power and related policies 
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that helps equip states to pursue more power in order to preserve or remove status 
quo, (Waltz, 1988).      
 
Mearsheimer’s view as an expert on this topic, asserts that “hegemony is the best 
strategy for a nation state” to pursue, if possible. He uses an “offensive realist” 
approach and maintain that “state will seek to maximize their power relative to others”, 
(Mearsheimer, 2001). He stresses that realists ignore the emphasis on “anarchy and 
power” and as a result directs them to a weak outlook of “international law and 
international institutions”, (Mearsheimer, 2001). To this end realists argue only state 
power can enforce law. Curiously, realist’s view, believe that states create 
“international law and international institutions, and may enforce the rules they codify”, 
(Slaughter, 2011, p. n.d.).  The rules do not regulate how state acts according to 
Slaughter, it is the “underlying material interests and power relations”, (Slaughter, 
2011). It is evident that that there is great emphasis on wealth and ‘power’. In 
Mearsheimer’s perspectives, ‘power’ is defined as constructed “on material 
capabilities, specifically the sum of military and latent power”, (Mearsheimer, 2001). 
He goes further and explains that the two dimensions noted, involve both the 
military/defense capabilities plus “wealth and population” being converted into “military 
power”, (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 1).  
 
Mearsheimer, refers to “unit of analysis” which resonates with Waltz’s inquiry into 
states as unit. In his view, powerful states comprises of “rational actors”, 
(Mearsheimer, 2001). This point is discussed further by Bates who affirmed that, ‘great 
power’ exercises its capacity to “think strategically and consider others’ preferences, 
they pay attention to both long-term and immediate consequences”, (Bates, 1975). 
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Mearsheimer also noted, that the occurring patterns of hegemonic behaviour indicated 
that, “System does not have status quo powers except for regional hegemons”, 
(Mearsheimer, 2001). 
 
Curiously, Robert Gilpin cites Thucydides’ thinking, and alert us to “the idea that the 
dynamic of international relations is provided by the differential growth of power among 
states [which he claims] is the driving force of international relations [and] can be 
identified as the theory of hegemonic war”, (Gilpin, 1988, p. 591). The high degree of 
growth distinguishes the state that becomes a dominant power or become a hegemon 
as opposed to the minor power which will play by the pre-determined rules of the game 
set by the dominant power and remain subordinate. In “Thucydides’ theory”, Gilpin 
affirms, this “power” dynamics impact the “structure of the system or distribution of 
power among the states” (Gilpin, 1988, p. 592).  
 
Evidently, hegemony constitutes enormous ‘power’ to attain the top tier of the ‘power 
hierarchy’ amongst states as actors. It signifies the “strategic nature of “hegemonic” 
relations among nation-actors using a game-theoretic model in which repeated play, 
incomplete information, and reputation are major elements”, (Alt, et al., 1988, p. 447). 
Stability will endure, as long as the superpower state remains a hegemon. To draw 
from Thucydides’ thoughts in Gilpin (1988, p.592), who asserts, “changes can take 
place if they do not threaten the vital interests of the dominant states and thereby 
cause a war among them”. 
 
A hegemonic state secures its position at all levels in the system in order to retain 
stability in the region. This is critical for a superordinate power to maintain the balance 
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and status quo. Gilpin points out, “such a stable system has an unequivocal hierarchy 
of power and an unchallenged dominant or hegemonic power”, (Gilpin, 1988, p. 592). 
The superiority of US in East Asia, Goh notes, showcases its leading power pre and 
post-Cold War era due in part to the operational limitations of regional options as in 
the case of the security zones and territorial dispute in South China Sea. These 
shortcomings are evident, whilst the US institution continues to be supreme in East 
Asia region as highlighted in Goh’s account of hegemony. Goh’s analysis can be 
applied to the ‘American Lake’ period of post WWII and Cold War era in the SPR which 
can include the first quarter of the 21st century as Steven Ratuva argued. Evidently, 
the apparent deficits of defined material and political alternatives in the region 
characterize the dominant state significantly.  
 
The downside to this is when this dominant power or ‘hegemony’ is challenged and 
the situation is reversed from being ‘stable’ to ‘unstable’. In Gilpin’s interpretation, “an 
unstable system” is when changes occur which involve, “economic, technological, and 
other changes [erode] the international hierarchy and [undermine] the position of the 
hegemonic state”, (Gilpin, 1988, p. 592). An example of this in the SPR is China’s 
growing influence as opposed to the US or even the Colonial Powers such as Great 
Britain and France who still have some island nations within the SP sub-region under 
their realm or members of the Commonwealth.  
 
It is apparent that for a super dominant state to assume the role of hegemony, it 
unilaterally constructs a system of structures that are layered. These structures 
constitute institutionalized frameworks modelled to the region it is aimed at, as in this 
instance, the SPR. The main purpose is to cater for the dominant power’s interests, 
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first and foremost, in areas such as political, economic or security issues. This allows 
the dominant power to engage and influence specific areas relevant to its interests 
such as regime formations. This is executed through established strategic alliances or 
arrangements with other states or organisations that it helps build up within and 
outside the region of its choice.  
 
To do this, it requires co-operation and collaboration amongst states within the region 
and sub region with the hegemonic power which evidently plays the key role and 
dictates the rules of the game.  Alt, et al (1988, p.447), argued that a large “feature” of 
the “hegemony theory” comes under the irregularity or unevenness of the size of states 
or what he terms “asymmetry of size”. Perhaps, this corresponds with Goh’s theory of 
“ordering of states” or the layered hierarchical view from the “superordinate” power to 
the subordinate states.  Furthermore, it adds that “the central feature of hegemony 
theory is that the hegemon is “big” relative to others”, (Alt, et al., 1988, p. 447). This is 
further explained by Robert Keohane in (Alt, et al., 1988, p. 447) who reasserts that “it 
may be big in markets, big in capital, big in resources, or big in military power”. 
 
An alternative view to this, as articulated does indicates that ‘hegemony’ means global 
dominance by a powerful state or “superordinate” (Goh, Evelyn., 2014). This is 
different from Mearsheimer’s view that no state can become a global hegemon, 
(Mearsheimer, 2001).  
 
However, it must be noted, that, there are other authors who have a cultural take on 
the term hegemony. One of those is, Anthony J. Marsella, Professor Emeritus of 
Psychology, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii, who insists, ““hegemony” 
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constitutes a serious challenge for developing nations and traditional cultures because 
it locates the power for moulding national policies and decisions in the hands of 
“foreign” interests”, (Marsella, 2005, p. 16).  
 
These thoughts resonate with the Pacific Islands in the SPR sub-region whose 
populations are below the one million mark excepting “Papua New Guinea (PNG) 
population of 7.476 million” (OECD, 2014). Furthermore, some of these island nations 
were colonized and now have become independent. Some of the Islands are still 
territories of the major powers such as the British, French and the US. To unpack 
Marsella’s thoughts on his version of hegemony, it is distinct that he implied, those big 
external powers that wield power in the region and effect as well as implement 
changes that impact the state’s “national policies and decisions”, (Marsella, 2005, 
p.16). This threatens the essence of these vulnerable island states and their 
established way of life, in this instance, the sub-region within SPR. Marsella’s believes 
these superpowers do receive gain for goods in return for their monetary contribution, 
be it aid or bilateral trade or investment. In addition, the big powers have the ability to 
implement and/or force changes often at such a rapid speed and thus impose their 
foreign will on these under-developed island states who are not ready for such 
massive transformation. This in turn creates confusion and as Marcella highlighted, 
the powers effecting these changes cause a ripple in the system and has a trickle-
down effect onto the most vulnerable. It can also create a state of dependency from 
the subordinate weaker states. 
 
Using Fiji, as a case example to demonstrate the effect of external institutions and 
powers mingled with ‘power grabbers’ within, it became a potent mix for the small 
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state. Fiji is part of the Melanesian sub-region, and is a weak island state that has 
been riddled with coup d’etat since 1987 through to the last coup of 05 December, 
2006. A reason given for the instability was attributed immediately after the “structural 
adjustment” as reported by Prasad and Kumar in (Ratuva, 2014, p. 2), which indicated 
the programs introduced by World Bank and a report written by Spate and Burns report 
in 1987. Fiji’s first coup was executed by Sitiveni Rabuka soon after. Prasad and 
Kumar in Ratuva (2014, p. 2) had articulated, “Fiji’s neoliberal policies were part of the 
structural adjustment programs by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) since the mid-1980s”, (Ratuva, 2014, p. 2). The changes received mixed 
reactions and Fiji coup culture has lasted for approximately twenty seven years, with 
the last coup held on 05 December, 2006 by Voreqe Bainimarama, that lasted eight 
years and has had crippling economic, political and cultural effect still felt today.    
 
Moreover, according to Marsella (2005, p.16), hegemony, “also pressures minority 
populations [such as in SPR for] developed nations to assimilate and to conform to the 
dominant culture”. This is an area that needs further scholarly research in particular, 
for the smaller island nations in the SPR who are at the mercy of powerful players 
which Marsella terms as “major players in “hegemonic” globalization which include 
North American and Western European nations and their satellite nation partners, 
media, national and international financial institutions” such as; “(World Bank, IMF, 
WTO), and of course, multinational corporations who hold no national loyalty” 
(Marsella, 2005, p. 16).  
 
This creates a sense of unease as the ‘superordinate’ state, as noted by Marsella 
asserting that the superordinate state acts in a “hegemonic” manner and imposes its 
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“values” as in the case of the U.S’s “popular culture, including individualism, 
materialism, competition, hedonism, rapid change (“progress”), profit, greed, 
commodification, consumerism, reductionism, celebritization, privatization, and 
English Language preference”, (Marsella, 2005, p. 16).  The influence of these popular 
cultures has spread rapidly amongst the younger generations, making these “powerful 
values” (Marsella, 2005), very trendy to these youth. Furthermore, it is being reinforced 
and sustained by the formation of institutions and organisations.  
 
These buttress the notion that these structures are deeply embedded in the system as 
widely read in IR literatures. These are layers of institutional framework that the 
dominant state sets up unilaterally in a given region to cater for its interests. These 
underpin the major actor to increase its presence within a region on a bilateral basis, 
allowing the more powerful state to dictate the rules of the game hence dominating 
other nations. It is evident that the influence of the prevailing state is significant over 
the others as it wields economic or military power by re-organising governance 
structures within the particular region it has influence in. To some extent it promotes 
and supports the regime formation within states in the region that will align with its 
intent on specific issues and gain cooperation this way. Here, we can see the effect of 
‘power’ of the dominant state and how it uses its influence towards the formation of 
‘regime’.  
 
 
3.0  What are different ways of achieving hegemony? 
Power is critical for a state to claim hegemonic status.  There have been significant 
debates among IR scholars in an attempt to define the attributes of a dominant state 
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that has achieved a hegemonic position. As earlier noted, to be a hegemon, the 
process begins at the regional level as a “regional power”, (Nolte, 2010, p. 881), where 
the relevant state assumes the top rank and becomes ‘superordinate’ (Goh, Evelyn., 
2014). There is a systematic method of analysing the structure to distinguish “regional 
powers from other states and to compare regional powers with regard to their power 
status or relative power”, as asserted by Nolte (2010, p. 881). He further adds, to be 
a regional power or leader in the region, one requires “regional followers”, (Nolte, 
2010, p. 894).  
 
Nolte indicates, there are two important aspects to be considered for a state to achieve 
hegemony; 1) how ‘followership’ is defined or ‘conceptualised’ and 2) “the strategies 
of regional powers”, (Nolte, 2010, p. 894).  These, Nolte asserts are relevant factors 
that attract some form of loyalty and “following”. Nolte indicated, scholarly enquiry on 
“regional architecture and power hierarchy in Southeast Asia demonstrates that the 
influence of minor or secondary powers on the configuration of a region and its 
institutional architecture could be quite significant”, (Nolte, 2010, p. 894). Conceivably, 
there are strong indicators of interactions at several levels in governance structures 
within and outside the region with a regional power, be it political, economic or cultural. 
To further illustrate these points, Nolte cites the US in its action within the East Asia 
Region and avows, “a strategy of embedding the middle powers, middle-tier states or 
regional powers”, (Nolte, 2010, p. 894). Curiously, China and India are cited. Perhaps, 
it can be argued that the US strategy in East Asia validates its influence and 
engagement as regional hegemon. The US is very powerful, it has 190 diplomatic ties 
with countries it has international relations with and plays a pivotal role in the region’s 
“multilateral institution”, (Nolte, 2010, p. 894). These are institutions set up by the 
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hegemonic power and examples of these are; Asia-Pacific Security Complex and 
APEC. This arrangement with states by the superordinate power, Nolte affirms, can 
work either way; “to influence their behaviour and make their actions calculable” or 
“used as instruments of discrimination and exclusion against other states”, (Nolte, 
2010, p. 894). 
 
Interestingly, Goh adds breadth to the hegemony theme and furthers the view that US 
is the regional power in East Asia, as it acts “as a central force in constituting regional 
stability and order”, (Goh, 2008, p. 353). She argues that the US is the “hegemony” 
and in her view the US projects such “superordinate” power in the region and this is 
what “defines regional order”, (Goh, 2008, p. 354). Goh’s thoughts reaffirm what Nolte 
had indicated above. However, with China’s emergence as a superpower, Goh 
asserts, it has challenged the status quo.  
 
There are two distinct groups of scholars, which Goh calls “US-centric”, which favour 
the US regional strategy, (Goh, 2008, p. 354) and the “regional centric” which “stress 
the importance ‘indigenous’ security dynamics”, Mastanduno in, (Goh, 2008, p. 354). 
Goh, asserts, in this instance, the US-centric is contrary to the “regional-centric 
perspective”, as Mastanduno argued. Goh further distinguishes the two positions, 
asserting that while the U.S. “is dominant in the region”, Mastanduno’s view alters this 
power position of US assuming “hegemonic” role, Mastanduno, (2003) in (Goh, 2008, 
p. 354). In essence, based on Goh’s observation, the two distinct groups in East Asia 
shows that one favours the US as the hegemonic power and one favours China. 
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The situation becomes even more intriguing during this contemporary period, as critics 
predict and asserted by Mastanduno in Goh (2008, p.354),  that China appears poised 
in the future to supersede the US in becoming the “hegemony in East Asia”, (Goh, 
2008). Are similar games of geopolitics being played out in the SPR? Ironically, the 
US during post WWII and pre and post-Cold War period was the hegemonic power, 
(Ratuva, 2014, p.410). In this quarter of the contemporary period, the US has notably, 
maintained and strengthened its current military, maritime and defense relations with 
both Australia and New Zealand in SPR, as clear from the NZ White Paper stating 
“The United States (US) is likely to remain the pre-eminent military power”, 
(NZDefence, 2010, p. 11). 
 
Goh also highlights another dimension of achieving hegemony tagged as “the 
ideational”, (Goh, 2008, p. 353). Goh argues this facet is crucial to a “layered rank 
order hierarchy”, (Goh, 2008, p. 353). This forms the crux of Goh’s argument where 
she establishes and replicates the distinct relationship between “sub- and super-
ordination among states”, (Goh, 2008, p. 357).   Here, one can see the ‘ordering of 
states’ as in ranking order where the superior power or ‘superordinate’ earns the 
pinnacle or highpoint. Goh claims “it’s a conceptual centrepiece [of what she insists] 
is a nuanced and complex notion of hegemony”, (Goh, Evelyn., 2014). 
 
Goh underscored the need to analyse “ideational dimensions of international orders” 
which flags a shift from the “anarchy assumptions of structural realism” that 
Mearsheimer upholds. In other words, Goh’s analysis here illustrates a point of 
departure from Mearsheimer’s theory on the international politics’ narrative of 
“offensive realism” which centres on “great power behaviour”, (Mearsheimer, 2001). 
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Furthermore, Mearsheimer’s theory has an authoritarian ring to it which imposes that 
“states should behave according to offensive realist dictates because they outline the 
best way to survive”, (Mearsheimer, 2001).  
 
In Mearsheimer’s view, ‘power’ is the combination of “the sum of military power and 
latent power”, (Mearsheimer, 2001). This involves in sum the military power which 
includes armed forces and naval as well as air forces. The addition of ‘latent power’ 
just means that the state has the ability to convert “assets of population and wealth 
into military power (‘mobilizable’ latent power)”, (Mearsheimer, 2001). He further 
elaborates that the “dominance of land power” implies that, “success [is] defined by 
[the] ability to conquer and control territory”, (Mearsheimer, 2001). Critics such as 
Robert Cox have argued, Mearsheimer has a limited version of power and overstates 
land power, (Cox, 1994). There is no mention of any non-military source of power. 
Mearsheimer’s emphasis is focused on regional hegemons as status quo states when 
compared to Kenneth Waltz, who asserts, all states are status quo, (Waltz, 1988).  
 
In the contemporary period, the significance of state actors, is included within 
“regimes” (Alt, et al., 1988, p. 446) even though regimes are rarely mentioned in 
Mearsheimer’s account. These regime with power in the specific region define “actions 
for [subordinate] members and persist when members follow these prescriptions”, (Alt, 
et al., 1988, p. 446) using “trade agreements” as an example. The analysis of dominant 
power by Alt et al, indicates that the supreme state has the ‘power’ to ‘conquer’ and 
‘control’ in a region and sees the regime in that region as “cooperative solutions to 
repeated collective action games”, (Alt, et al., 1988, p. 446). This reflects “many of the 
insights of hegemony theory [that] turns out to be features of a repeated game of 
    
 
 
26 | P a g e  
  
incomplete information”, (Alt, et al., 1988, p. 446). According to Alt et al, “games 
involving reputation” are linked as “dilemma”, (Stein 1984 in Alt et al, 1988, p. 446) or 
parameters of “hegemonic stability” (Alt, et al., 1988, p. 446). It is here that Snidal in 
Alt et al (1998, p.446) comments that the “distinction between “benevolent” and 
“coercive” strands of hegemony theory is thus subsumed within the unified model”, 
(Alt, et al., 1988, p. 446).  
 
Goh has “three key” themes in an attempt to apply a cutting edge diagnostic approach 
to penetrate the current complex scholarly debates that surround “East Asian Security 
and US foreign policy” whether they point towards “theoretical extremes of realism 
versus liberalism”, (Goh, Evelyn., 2014, p. 21). In addition, Goh’s efforts to explore 
other “policy” choices of restrain or adapt; or blunt allegations that “China is either a 
security provider or security detractor (Ba)”, (Goh, Evelyn., 2014, p. 21). Despite the 
shift in thinking, Goh affirms, the US retains “hegemony” in East Asia”, (Goh, 2008, p. 
354). Goh is undeterred by Mastanduno’s argument in page 16 of this paper.    
 
No doubt, Goh examines the hegemony topic with a specialist perspective for East 
Asia region which I have drawn on to evaluate if hegemony is possible in the SPR. 
Goh defines ‘power’ in this instance, as “based on material capabilities” and asserts 
that the region “has preserved the material distribution of power”, (Goh, Evelyn., 2014, 
p. 22).  In her view, whilst the US remains dominant in the region, there is “the regional 
preferences to incorporate the rising China, thus in effect creating a layered hierarchy 
with China, Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN states lining up beneath the overarching 
layer of US hegemony”, (Goh, Evelyn., 2014, p. 22). Perhaps, Goh’s expert views, 
when applied in a much small scale, can be translated into the South Pacific scenario 
    
 
 
27 | P a g e  
  
to assist in ascertaining whether hegemony is possible in the South Pacific Region 
and if it is, who will it be? 
 
Can Goh’s concept of a regional order be applied in the SPR? With China’s interest 
gaining traction in the region and the US response in its Pacific Pivot, this means, 
further rigorous research is required into Goh’s conception of rules and the means to 
sustain it, as well as, to promote and share or collaborate with SPR states that are 
like-minded or have dealings that are common to each other. These states impart 
common understandings of the type of interests and values as well as their limits or 
boundaries and conditions they operate within or are governed by. This defines the 
common theme or understanding the framework designed to assist each of these 
member states.  It also allows each member state within the defined region, in this 
instance SPR, to be clear as to who are the actors involved, the expected behaviours 
and the process for state actor interactions with each other on an international regional 
space, be it a diplomatic or bilateral and/or multi-lateral arrangement. It is at this 
juncture, one distinguishes the part a powerful state plays as it assumes the role of 
hegemony in the region. The great power or superordinate state provides some form 
of stability with its leadership style and exerts its authority which as indicated earlier 
does give it some form of legitimacy by these subordinate states. This also gives that 
perception of the ‘superordinate power’ above the layered hierarchy patterns and 
hegemony.  
 
Furthermore in Goh’s analysis, ‘regional ordering’ is crucial to a hegemonic power. 
She believes “hegemonic order”, (Goh, 2008, p. 354), is made possible in two ways; 
that whilst power is a critical factor in forming the collective foundation “from below”, it 
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is also due to the leading power’s capacity. So in essence, it works both ways, where 
hegemony endures by both these dynamics, as the ‘superordinate’ power is being 
given legitimacy by the subordinate powers, (Goh, 2008, p. 353). Whilst the US plays 
a key part in “East Asia’s evolving security order” (Goh, 2008, p. 353), it re-asserts its 
place as a “central force in constituting regional stability and order” in the region and 
is not “treated as an extra-regional actor”. She goes further and explains that the US 
leads the “layered regional hierarchy” (Goh, 2008, p. 353), with East Asian countries 
such as “China, Japan, and India constituting layers underneath its dominance”. This 
then gives a clear indication that the state with hegemonic power is the most dominant 
until another state surpasses it.  
 
Perhaps, this same scenario can be equated to that of the SPR when in the 20 th 
Century, the U.S. was the dominant power in the Pacific region and earned its name, 
as the “American Lake” (Lattimore, 1945, p. 313). The US was predominantly, the 
superpower during this period and became a strong Western influence in SPR even 
till today. It had strong interaction with the SPR retaining similar strategy, and had 
been influential to the “PIFCs politically, economically and culturally”, Keown et al, 
2014 in, (Ratuva, 2014, p. 410). NZ, in its 2010 White Paper, recognises the “fragility” 
of the South Pacific and has asserted, it looks to “Australia” as its “most important 
security partner, [and stipulates] we will continue to play a leadership role in the region, 
acting as a trusted friend to our South Pacific neighbours”, (NZDefence, 2010, p. 11).  
Australia, in turn has maintained its link with the US via the ANZUS Treaty which was 
signed on “1st September, 1951”, (AustralianGovernment, 1951). Whilst NZ did appear 
to have weakened its ANZUS link with the US, it has since strengthened its diplomatic 
ties in 2010, under the “Wellington Declaration”, signed by Minister of Foreign Affairs 
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for New Zealand Murray McCully and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton of the 
United States of America….4 November, 2010”, (NZGovernment, 2010). The “United 
States-New Zealand strategic partnership” reaffirms the link between the two nations, 
(NZGovernment, 2010).  These arrangements re-assert Goh’s analysis on the effect 
of “layered regional hierarchy” (Goh, 2008, p. 353), after all NZ, Australia and the US 
plus all the Pacific Islands in SPR are all Pacific nations. However, only one state can 
act the part of hegemon. NZ had also reiterated, “As we look to the challenges of the 
21st century, our shared democratic values and common interests will continue to 
guide our collective efforts”, (NZGovernment, 2010).  
 
As Ratuva noted, historically, the US, a dominant power in SPR have had strategic 
posturing then and even today as reaffirmed in NZ 2010 White Paper. The strategic 
stance is to “prevent any potential adversary from gaining a strategic posture in the 
South Pacific that could pose a challenge to its hegemony1 ”, (Ratuva, 2014, p. 410). 
The US, no doubt, acted the part of a regional power within the SPR geographical 
region and possessed supreme “superordinate”, (Goh, 2008) status and economic 
influence in the region.  
 
The US, as the regional power and an independent powerful nation exercised great 
influence in neighbouring countries, not only in East Asia, as palpable from Goh’s 
account of the US influence in East Asia but also in the Pacific, particularly, the SPR. 
Ratuva reiterates this point when he cites Zarsky et al, (1986), that “the US [had] 
strategic and military dominance through its numerous bases, military networks and 
alliances around the Pacific and Pacific Rim countries”. He even indicated that the 
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US’s tactic was grounded on the “strategic ‘denial’ doctrine which involved the central 
role of the ANZUS alliance….to keep the Pacific free of Soviet influence through aid, 
diplomacy and other means”, (Ratuva, 2014, p. 410).  
 
It was observed that the US decreased its arrangement with the Pacific Island 
Countries “PIFCs” as Ratuva noted, “because of priorities elsewhere and it was 
assumed that Australia, the United States closest ally in the Pacific, was to take care 
of the Pacific on its behalf as “deputy sheriff”, Fry & Kutaulaka, (2008) in, (Ratuva, 
2014, p. 410). Though, in recent years, China’s rising power and its deepening 
engagement in the SPR, has prompted the US to re-adjust its “US strategic approach 
from indirect engagement to direct involvement”, (Ratuva, 2014, p. 410).  
 
Interestingly, to this end, Yang observes, “China’s deepening involvement in the South 
Pacific is a calculated strategic move for its military security”, (Yang, 2009, p. 139). 
Yet, he suggested, that the move may have a long term impact on “China’s 
reunification strategy and it serves China’s long term development strategy”, it 
nevertheless, has minimal “strategic value of the South Pacific to China’s national 
security”, (Yang, 2009, p. 139). Yang cited Biddick (1989, p.802) affirming that 
“China’s influence in the South Pacific appears to be growing rapidly”, (Yang, 2009, p. 
139) and “the PRC is likely to play a larger role as a Pacific maritime power”. The 
debate regarding PRC’s chequebook diplomacy, Hanson (2008) in (Yang, 2009, p. 
142) indicated, “Chinese involvement in the region provides ‘more opportunity than 
threat’”. An alternate view to this, indicates that PRC is flexing its muscle in the Pacific 
Islands region as a sign of diplomatic competition between PRC and Taiwan. Both 
countries offered soft loan or check-book diplomacy with minimal accountability and 
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which suited island political leaders quite well as their interests took priority over 
national development interests. 
 
Goh (2008, p. 355), highlights the lack of challenges to the US “global preponderance”, 
(Goh, 2008, p. 369). She asserts there is little contest to the US status quo. The US 
still however, is dependent and “relies significantly on cooperation from other states to 
maintain its power”, (Goh, 2008, p. 355).Goh indicates, “three of the key potential 
global challengers to US unipolarity [will] originate from Asia (China, India, and Japan), 
and their support for or acquiescence to, US dominance have helped to stabilize global 
leadership”, (Goh, 2008, p. 369).   
 
It appears, as Goh points out, that the US is the hegemon in East Asia, as opposed to 
Mastanduno’s view and reaffirms that the US sits on the pinnacle of that ranking order. 
This is a “form of hierarchy [that] refers to unequal relations among states” (Goh, 2008, 
p. 355). There is distinct differences “on hegemony or empire when thinking about 
hierarchy”. Two points Goh raises; hegemony and hierarchy and asserts, “the regional 
hierarchy in East Asia is still dominated by the United States”, (Goh, 2008, p. 368). US 
is the ‘superordinate’ power and below the layered hierarchy are other powers such 
as China, India, Japan and thereafter, the  smaller subordinate powers.  Since the 
1970s China has “claimed the position of second-ranked great powers” which Goh 
argues, has been “legitimized by the hierarchical deference shown by smaller 
subordinate powers”, (Goh, 2008, p. 369). This Goh refers to as the ordering of states 
in the East Asia. This concept can also be applied to the SPR where China established 
itself and have become influential as the first external power to sign diplomatic links 
with the fourteen Pacific Islands states in the sub-region of the SPR. Alternatively, US 
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has deepened its strategic security engagement as evident from the outposts now 
located in several parts of Australia. 
 
Goh sees one of the ‘defining characteristics of hierarchical system as “voluntary 
subordination of lesser states to the dominant state”, (Goh, 2008, p. 369).   She uses 
Japan as an example, indicating that it is still under the US umbrella in its security 
alliance affirming, “Japan is not yet a ‘normal’ country”, (Goh, 2008, p. 369). In addition, 
she implies “international hierarchies”, (Goh, 2008, p. 355), constitute a varied scope 
where they ranges from “relationships of subordination and super-ordination within the 
anarchical state system”. Kang further explains, the IR version Kenneth Waltz founded 
as an “alternative definition of hierarchy” and equates “hierarchy” and “anarchy” as 
“diametrical opposite”, (Kang, 2015). 
 
Within this setting, the US by occupying the top tier of the power hierarchy was able 
to maintain some form of stability, which in Goh’s opinion was based not only on 
“coercion” but also on “consent”, (Goh, Evelyn., 2014). The shade of Evelyn Goh’s 
study of hegemony has somewhat given a heightened meaning to this aspect of state 
hierarchies. It is apparent that the super-powerful state can be equated to a state that 
has amassed an abundant build-up of power-currencies of sort, which ultimately 
secures the top rung of the ladder in a collection of states in a given region. To be a 
hegemon in the region, involves a complex process. To get to the high point, the state 
would have had to set up some mechanism such as geographical positioning, 
economic and defence capability, technological advances and its reliability including 
soft power facilities in its foreign policies. Goh’s take on hegemony has a sharp social 
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component to it which in her analysis, allows actors to pursue validation and curb 
power disparities through promoting “institutionalised cooperation”, (Goh, 2008).  
 
Here, one can visualise the divergence of views of difference with models of 
hierarchies widely discussed in IR literatures that benefit either the two approaches of 
‘consent’ and/or ‘coercion’. Goh’s approach towards the concept of hegemony is one 
of regional order which is hegemonic in nature and dynamic. The process undergoes 
ongoing changes, adjustment and evolves within the regional order. In Goh’s theory, 
it is the “order transition” that trumps the “power transition”, (Goh, 2008, p. 354). Goh’s 
account with regards to favouring the “order transition rather than power transition as 
the central problematic driving regional politics since 1989”, (Goh, Evelyn., 2014, p. 
1). This reveals that the regional order with its layered tiers up to the top of the 
hierarchy and below create challenges more than the superordinate power itself. Kang 
wraps this up precisely when he stated, “In sum, hegemony is a form of hierarchy that 
involves more than material power; it also involves a set of norms – social order- that 
secondary states find legitimate thus making it a social system”, (Kang, 2015, p. 31).  
 
Given the significant or dominant role the US plays within the East Asia and the SPR 
region and the evolving nature within the international system, China’s rise alerted the 
US to adjust its current position. It is the most powerful in East Asia and while the US 
has recognised that China is an emerging great power, it will take a while before it can 
be declared a hegemony.  It is evident from Goh’s account in East Asia and in 
Mearsheimer’s viewpoint, that the US will remain the superordinate power as it had 
“maximized” its “relative power” (Mearshiemer, 2012). Mearsheimer asserts, this is the 
best way to survive as a hegemon. Furthermore, the superordinate state validates its 
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position as a regional power within a geographical zone and possesses unrivalled 
super power status and economic influence in that particular region, (Mearshiemer, 
2001). He adds that the US has this advantage, as it already dominates the Western 
Hemisphere and this has allowed the US to “roam freely” in that part of the world, 
(Mearsheimer, 2014). To this end, the US will not allow competition. How then, can 
this apply to an emerging power like China which appears to have established itself 
well into the SPR? 
A hegemonic power controls the region, in essence and it wields hyper-ordinate power 
and is accorded acceptance of that in return by the subordinate powers which include 
both middle and minor powers that it has struck some sort of covenant or agreement 
with.  These behaviour is what sets a regional hegemon apart. It is clear that the US 
played this role well for a very long time both in the East Asia region and also in the 
Pacific post 1945 through to the Cold War period Though, it has been duly recorded 
that the US response to China’s global rising power and its emergence in South East 
Asia and SPR has forced the US to adapt to the changes.  
 
 
4.0  Who May Have Been/Could Be a Hegemon in the South Pacific? 
Geographically, the SPR has considerably more ocean than landmass, now commonly 
coined as the ‘Pacific Ocean of Peace’ or Pacific the “peaceful ocean”, 2 (NOAA, 
2014). Steven Ratuva, a seasoned Pacific Political Scientist of Fijian-Indigenous 
heritage emphasized that “the late Fijian-Tongan anthropologist Epeli Hau’ofa (1993) 
coined the phrase ‘our sea of islands’”, (Ratuva, 2014, p. 409). Clearly, Ratuva 
alluded, and further unpacked Hau’ofa’s views that the “Pacific, [is] not a group of tiny 
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and disparate islands in an empty ocean”, (Ratuva, 2014, p. 409). He iterated that it is 
instead, “a large oceanic continent that defined the Pacific people’s sense of being 
and primordial claim to sovereignty and ownership of their oceanic cosmology”, 
(Ratuva, 2014, p. 409).   
 
Using the lenses from the smaller island states to examine the ‘regional order’ and 
‘powers’ closer to home in the SPR, it is crucial to reflect on what Hau’ofa articulated, 
“We have passed through that stage into the Pacific Islands Region of naked, neo-
colonial dependency. Our erstwhile suitors are now creating with others along the rim 
of our [South Pacific] ocean a new set of relationships that excludes us totally”, 
(Hau'ofa, 1998, p. 398). Hau’ofa seems to alert us to internal and external power 
dynamics or even rivalry of ‘powers’ in the region which appears to have a default 
setting in excluding the islands. Why? He asserted, “our exclusion” would not have 
mattered if it was elsewhere, however, the smaller islands in the SPR, “are physically 
located at the very center of what is occurring around us”, (Hau'ofa, 1998, p. 398). 
Most SPR island states places NZ and Australia, as actors at the “rim”, (Hau'ofa, 1998, 
p. 398), as opposed to being within. For the purpose of this paper, and considering 
the geographical scoping of the SPR, both countries have a place within the ‘rim’. It is 
how they both act their part in the SPR that is crucial in order to understand both 
powers’ strategies and policy. This point is further explored in the ranking table which 
identifies NZ and Australia as the two main donors in the SPR. Yang in his effort to 
“present an in-depth analysis of China’s ‘hegemonic rise” in the South Pacific” 
reiterates the point that this may “threaten Western interests”, (Yang, 2009, p. 142). In 
Yang’s view, both Australia and New Zealand are “regional powers”, (Yang, 2009, p. 
142) in the SPR. 
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Nonetheless, it is important to indicate the role of external powers, China and the US 
have in the SPR while attempting to ascertain if hegemony is possible in the in the 
SPR region. Yang asserts that, “China’s long-term goal is to ultimately replace the 
United States as the pre-eminent power in the Pacific Ocean”, (Yang, 2009, p. 141). 
Meanwhile, the “governments of many Pacific states” according to Yang, “welcome 
the Chinese involvement in the region”, (Yang, 2009, p. 141). Critics are already 
predicting that “the rivalry between China and the United States in the South Pacific 
has already begun”, (Yang, 2009, p. 141). Already, media outlets, as noted in Yang, 
have echoed sentiments that “consistent signals to the region and the world at large3”, 
have begun in earnest with Washington indicating ‘that it intends to firmly drop anchor 
in the world’s single largest geographical feature, the Pacific Ocean”, (Yang, 2009, p. 
141). As was noted in 2007, Washington, after sending senior officials to the regional 
forum in SPR “took twenty island leaders for a meeting in Washington, DC, the first to 
be held on the mainland”, (Yang, 2009, p. 141).  
 
It is evident that the “power concept of regional powers”, (Nolte, 2010, p. 898), as 
observed is a good “starting point for mapping internal structure of regions and the 
type of regional power (s) in each region”, (Nolte, 2010, p. 898). Nolte elaborates on 
these lines and affirmed the questions as to “who will dominate and set the rules..?”, 
(Nolte, 2010, p. 896). These thoughts echo Huntington’s prediction of “multipolar 
twenty-first century”, (Nolte, 2010, p. 896). How does this affect the future regional 
structure for SPR in particular the vulnerable and weaker, troubled island states in the 
Arc of Melanesia or just all the smaller islands in the region? 
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Goh’s analysis of ‘power’ here, relates to material and military/defense capability. She 
distinguishes ‘power’ from ‘order’ in the region and asserts the two words had raised 
some concerns from Western scholars who had critiqued her book. It is obvious the 
concept of ‘power’ and ‘power transition’ in her view is a realist take for the “overly 
materialist conceptualizations of power and order” as well as their bias conflict”, (Goh, 
Evelyn., 2014, p. 8).. The emphasis is to critically examine states within the region 
“that are powerful” in particular those with “material resources and capabilities”, (Nolte, 
2010, p. 884).  
 
Using the SPR as a geographical backdrop, it can be argued that Australia could fit 
into this category as a country that tries “to exercise leadership in this regional [SPR] 
setting”, (Nolte, 2010, p. 884). New Zealand, as an internal actor like Australia, would 
rate as the 2nd tier within the South Pacific regional hierarchy. Pacific Islands, such as 
Papua New Guinea and Fiji are the only two that possess some form of military and 
defense capacity but are geared more towards United Nations’ Peace keeping 
missions to promote global security rather than being an island with military capability 
per se. Within the regional structure and as noted in the table chart for this paper, the 
distinction between “regional powers and regional leadership”, (Nolte, 2010, p. 884) 
begins to emerge. Likewise, if we are to probe into the areas of “regional powers and 
power hierarchies”, (Nolte, 2010, p. 884), in the 21st century, it poses a challenge as 
to how the dominant blueprint of regional hegemony can be ascertained. In addition, 
Nolte is of the view that it is possible for “regional powers [to] exploit or depend on the 
regional governance structures as part of their strategy for achieving regional 
hegemony”, (Nolte, 2010, p. 884).  
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Perhaps, the notion, that Feizkhah (2001, p.34) in Yang asserts, may come to fruition 
in the SPR, that in the next few years “a collection of states [will] owe their primary 
allegiance to a country outside our alliance”, (Yang, 2009, p. 141). No doubt, one of 
the challenges is embedded within what Yang articulates, that Oceania “could no 
longer be taken for granted” and persist to be “a relatively benign ‘American Lake”, 
(Yang, 2009, p. 141). To this end, Beijing has skilfully put in place in the SPR “a 
combination of trade, aid and skilful diplomacy”, as its groundwork “for a new regional 
order with China as the natural leader and the United States as the outsider”, (Yang, 
2009, p. 141).  
 
However, there is a slant to the story, as J. Yang aptly puts, “Beijing is unlikely to be 
a dominant military power in the South Pacific in the foreseeable future”, (Yang, 2009, 
p. 147). Furthermore, Yang asserted, “While Washington was watching China’s ‘hard’ 
power, China had been building up its ‘soft’ power in the South Pacific”, (Yang, 2009, 
p. 147). Ratuva reasserts this point when he stated, “In contrast, China is more 
focused on ‘soft power’ approach through diplomacy and economic relations”, 
(Ratuva, 2014, p. 411). These lines resonate well with the points both, Epeli Hau’ofa 
and Steven Ratuva articulated with regards to what defines the “sovereignty and 
ownership” of the South Pacific ocean. It poses a challenge to the ‘superordinate’ 
powers for the choices therein, now available for subordinate states in the SPR more 
so the Pacific island states to either align with a superpower that offers ‘hard power’ 
or ‘soft power’ or even both.  
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To this end, the foreign policies and diplomatic approach by the US and China seems 
to favour one or the other or a mingling of both. Yang (2009, p.141), appears adamant 
that “a great power rivalry for dominance seems inevitable”. Windybank (2005, p.20) 
in (Yang, 2009) reaffirms in Yang, who “emphasizes that ‘Foreign policy pundits are 
already calling a new geopolitical game of power politics and interstate rivalry as a 
rising China seeks to draft as many countries as possible into the sphere of influence“, 
(Yang, 2009, p. 141). A good example of this will be the 14 Pacific islands that have 
signed diplomatic ties with PRC. This points towards the fact that “the [established] 
Pacific Ocean could in future become the venue for a new Cold War, where the United 
States and China compete for client states and strategic advantage”, (Yang, 2009, p. 
141). It is useful to cite Robert Gilpin, in this instance, when he illustrated what 
Thucydides wrote in his Treatise, “…he [Thucydides] was addressing, “those inquirers 
who desire an exact knowledge of the past as an aid to the interpretation of the future, 
which in the course of human things must resemble if it does not reflect it..”, (Gilpin, 
1988, p. 591). If one was to interpret China and the US behaviour within SPR, in an 
effort to answer the hegemony question for this paper, then Thucydides, was on point 
in defining ‘the behaviour and phenomena that he observed [of state powers which] 
would repeat themselves throughout history”, (Gilpin, 1988, p. 591), and which we now 
call “international relations”. 
 
Notably, the US promoted its “Year of the Pacific”, (Ratuva, 2014, p. 414) strategy 
under its US “43rd President George W. Bush”, (Freidel & Sidey, 2006), administration 
and urged on by President Obama’s “pivot [which] is much more comprehensive and 
encompassing”, (Ratuva, 2014, p. 414). Even more interesting for SPR is what Ratuva 
calls, “the ‘spill-over’ of the pivot on PIFC’s”, (Ratuva, 2014, p. 414), as this impacts 
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on the “geopolitical interconnectedness between Asia and the Pacific”, (Ratuva, 2014, 
p. 414). He iterates that the “Pacific is the common ‘shared’ space between China and 
the United States”, (Ratuva, 2014, p. 414). Ratuva further argued, “it is where they 
[China and US] define, project and protect their respective sovereign sea borders, thus 
both see themselves as Pacific powers”, (Ratuva, 2014, p. 414).  
 
The trend of rivalry between the two big powers SPR is evident as the US steps up its 
engagement and policies in the region as Ratuva  asserted, that the “Pacific Islands 
Conference of Leaders (PIFCL) triennial meeting in Washington DC” in 2007 covered 
important issues such as , “expansion of public diplomacy, strengthening economic 
ties, US military expansion in Guam and impact on the region, cultural and educational 
exchanges, aid, trade, global warming and democracy”, (Ratuva, 2014, p. 411). 
Furthermore, in “September 2012, Ms Clinton…at the Post-Forum Dialogue at Pacific 
Island Forum leaders meeting in Rarotonga, Cook Islands”, (Ratuva, 2014, p. 411) 
restated the point that “she committed long-term US aid and engagement with the 
PIFCs and declared that the ‘Pacific is big enough for all of us’, an obvious reference 
to China and other foreign powers”, (Ratuva, 2014, p. 411). 
 
Whilst China pursued “its soft power in the South Pacific”, (Yang, 2009, p. 147), the 
US appeared focused on its ‘hard power’ approach as was noted during the ‘American 
Lake’ influence, “American warfighting strategy and foreign policy have heightened the 
nuclear danger in the Pacific”, (Hayes, et al., 1986, p. 4). Whilst Hayes comments may 
appear dated, it still echoes some truth in the current day ‘power’ and ‘order’ dynamics 
in SPR.  
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As a point of interest, Rosemary Foot, indicated the year 2009 had witnessed “top 
American and Chinese officials [who] have repeatedly stressed that the two countries 
are ‘in the same boat” and need to work together to weather the storm of several 
crises”, (Foot, 2009, p. 123).  Her “boat metaphor” is powerful as she emphasises that 
the “successful voyage requires a single designated captain; orders, given harshly or 
kindly, are expected to be obeyed; and there has to be agreement on the rules of 
navigation”, (Foot, 2009, p. 123).  In Foot’s views her boat analogy speaks volume 
and seizes the critical points of “cooperation and competition contained within the 
Sino-American relationship”, (Foot, 2009, p. 123).  
 
Evidently, Foot stresses that “we are witnessing a transition of power from the United 
States to China which might well involve intense rivalry and potentially even war”, 
(Foot, 2009, p. 123). This is the new security dilemma in the Asia-Pacific region which 
has enjoyed relative peace since 1979, but “the strategic architecture has been 
unsettled by China’s growing influence [in this instance in SPR] and [its] ability to 
project power”, (Foot, 2009, pp. 123-4). The question that arises and as asserted by 
Foot, is whether China’s growth of power and influence is parallel to the U.S. policy 
towards the end of the 19th and 20th century. On closer examination, whilst both the 
US and China’s interest in the 21st Century may be about the sea routes that spread 
across the Pacific Oceans, the US still retains the upper hand as it has a tight security 
alliances with Australia and New Zealand and other island states in SPR.  This is 
despite China’s increased trade and diplomatic ties with New Zealand. Whilst Yang 
claims, “It has become trendy to talk about China’s soft power” (Yang, 2009, p. 147), 
the US, on the other hand, has maintained to remain focused on its mission to engage 
and strengthen its relationship in the region. Perhaps, it can be argued that history is 
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being rewritten and it is no longer viable to retain that label of calling the Pacific, “The 
American Lake”, (Hayes, et al., 1986).  
 
As a point of interest, when revisiting Ratuva’s poignant comments, indicating, “the 
notion of ‘our sea’ has been expropriated and redefined in a new lexical context as 
competing hegemons in the form of the United States and China stake their claim and 
legitimacy in the Pacific”, (Ratuva, 2014, p. 409). Ratuva does challenge the SPR and 
others creating an awareness to riveting dynamics of superpower play in the region 
that has eventuated into the first quarter of 21st Century. Ratuva’s thought also 
resonate with Goh’s analysis of ‘hegemonic order’ which works well on a dual basis, 
“from below” and the ‘superordinate’ power’s capacity, (Goh, 2008, p. 353). Ratuva, 
highlights, “the United States and Chinese engagement in the Pacific manifests a 
clash of foreign policies that mimics the cold war confrontation of post-World War II 
era”, (Ratuva, 2014, p. 409). To this end, I agree. 
 
Certainly, the two great powers, China and the US, boasting large landmasses and 
possess hegemonic characteristics, as apparent from the ranking table cited in this 
paper, and as the two ‘superordinate’ powers appear to be on a path of “rivalry”, (Yang, 
2009, p. 141), to further their interests and influence in the Pacific region. Interestingly, 
Yang noted, “the region’s Island Business Magazine published an editorial in June 
2007 claiming that; “the United States of America has sent consistent signals to the 
region and the world at large that it intends to firmly drop anchor in the world’s single 
largest geographical feature, the Pacific Ocean””, (Yang, 2009, p. 141).  
PRC, in the late 1990s had courted the island leaders since it stepped up its increased 
interests and influence in the SPR. IR scholars have attempted to diagnose PRC’s 
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deepening interest in the region with some concluding that it is related more to the 
China-Taipei saga. Yang claims that PRC aims to be a major actor in the SPR, more 
so, to be the “Pacific maritime power”, (Yang, 2009, p. 140). 
 
US on the other hand, responded to PRC’s interests and influence by re-engaging with 
the region. It has re-emerged even though critics say, it never left the region and have 
re-invigorated its involvement in the SPR. Furthermore, it is poignant to mention Hillary 
Clinton as former US Secretary of State had earlier “accused China of ‘wine and dine’ 
diplomacy by inviting leaders in Beijing as well as its support for Fiji’s ‘dictatorial 
regime’”, (Ratuva, 2014, p. 418). Mrs Clinton’s tune changed again when she visited 
Australia a year after, which Ratuva noted to be “conciliatory”, (Ratuva, 2014, p. 418). 
Observers were quick to remark on Mrs Clinton’s Australian speech that it was similar 
to what “China’s Assistant Foreign Minister Le Yucheng in December 2011 
[said]….We hope the United States can play a constructive role in this region [Asia-
Pacific] and that includes respecting China’s major concerns and core interests. The 
Pacific Ocean is vast enough to accommodate the coexistence and cooperation, not 
confrontation between these two big countries”, (Ratuva, 2014, p. 418). 
 
In order to further understand the power dynamics, it may be worthwhile to revisit John 
Mearsheimer, (2001), who used the analogy of large landmass to equate “landpower” 
and seapower”. Mearsheimer argues there can only be one hegemon in the region. 
There is a point of difference by two academics as Goh reasserts that the U.S. is 
hegemon for East Asia whilst Ratuva (2014, p. 409), argues, US and China are 
hegemons in the South Pacific region. These views are not reflected in the ranking 
    
 
 
44 | P a g e  
  
table prepared for this paper as both the US and PRC do not rank as top donors in 
SPR.  
  
Nevertheless, it is evident both the US and China have visibly deepened their 
engagement in the SPR.  Interestingly, the US strategy of military operations [during] 
the Cold War era extended from “Aleutian Islands off the coast of Alaska to China and 
the Soviet Far East and encompassing all the Pacific and Indian Ocean….covers 
nearly half of the surface of the earth”, (Hayes, et al., 1986, p. 4). Today, US has set 
up newer bases in Australia and have strengthened its security and defense 
arrangements in the region. During this period, there were already claims by the US 
that “the Pacific [was] primarily a maritime theatre….and the Pacific a Navy precinct”, 
(Hayes, et al., 1986, p. 4). These thoughts by Hayes project the rigour of a ‘hyper-
power’ with military/maritime muscle considering that Hayes et Al. paper was penned 
in 1986 and the issues of power have are complex, if we are to cite Ratuva, Goh, Yang 
and Foot’s most recent positions on the Sino-American rivalry. The momentum is 
gathering towards some newer version of Pacific Islands Monroe Doctrine of sorts. 
Who will be the hegemon in the region, will it be China or the US?      
 
Notably, a Chinese scholar, described the “Pacific Island countries (PICs) [as] 
developing countries with small land areas and small populations”, (YU, 2014). This is 
in contrast to the two great powers, US and China, both possessing ‘landpower’ and 
‘seapower’. Closer to home, within the SPR, are the two middle powers; NZ and 
Australia.  Interestingly, as YU iterated, “The Pacific has become ‘an important 
strategic link in China’s greater periphery diplomacy [中国大周边战略的重要环节]’ for 
China in the 21st Century”, (YU, 2014). Undoubtedly, China as similar to the US and 
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other early colonizers in the region are aware that some of these islands as noted in  
YU, “are rich in natural resources, especially minerals and marine resources”, (YU, 
2014).  
 
The question that arises, are these resources, the reasons why these superpowers 
have descended into the SPR where games of convergence and competition seem to 
be the order of the day? Or is it a new wave of colonization of the SPR re-packaged 
in the contemporary sense? Perhaps, it may be just to secure trade routes and/or 
military/maritime strategy, seeing that both the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean 
now tagged as “Indo-Pacific”, (Indo-Pacific Governance Research Centre, 2015) are 
lucrative strategic points that cover “nearly half of the surface of the earth”, (Hayes, et 
al., 1986, p. 4). It is vital that the social aspect of hegemony, as noted by both David 
Kang and Evelyn Goh needs to be configured into the conversation. It reaffirms points 
earlier noted in Goh’s analysis on the ‘regional order’, that it is the “order transition” as 
opposed to “power transition” that is crucial. Whilst scholarly research literatures 
articulate the importance that besides the SPR, the new shift to embrace the “rising 
Indo Pacific powers” (Indo-Pacific Governance Research Centre, 2015) is gaining 
momentum.  This aspect is another moot point that requires further scholarly research 
as it does impact on Goh’s argument of “order transition” and “power transition”, (Goh, 
2008, p. 354). 
 
What Goh has identified with “order transition” and “power transition” can be linked to 
the European imperial powers’ strategy in SPR during the 19 th century when 
historically, the British and the French colonized the region. These imperial powers 
introduced regimes that replicated their own style of governance on a much smaller 
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version. Britain assisted by Australia and NZ helped set up institutions in the region 
such as Pacific Island Forum (PIF) which still exists today. Educational institutions and 
communications were established. A modified version of democratic system of 
government blended with social constructs of the small island nations were set up, 
remnants of which are still evident today. This does relate to hegemonic characteristics 
that Goh identified with the added ‘social’ component added. Does this make either 
the French or the British hegemon during this time? It could have been for Britain. 
According to Hayes et al, “By the end of the [2nd world] war Europe’s colonial hold in 
the Pacific was mortally wounded”, (Hayes, et al., 1986, p. 11). These thoughts are 
further noted by Eleanor Lattimore when she referred to the “Pacific Theatre” and 
“American Lake” (Lattimore, 1945). Lattimore reaffirmed that into the latter part of the 
20th Century, the US and the colonizers in the region appeared to have carved up the 
Pacific amongst themselves with little or no input from the inhabitants of these islands. 
Some of the islands that were oblivious to the outcomes soon found themselves 
grouped into SPR with sworn allegiance to the powerful nations of faraway shores like 
Britain, France and America. Today, perhaps due to geographical proximity, NZ and 
Australia have assumed the role Britain once had in the region during the colonial era. 
In examining the recent developments in the SPR, it is evident that there is strong 
competition between the two powers; US and China. The Pacific had earlier been 
dubbed as the ‘Pacific Theatre’ and as Lattimore affirmed, “the United States [had 
proposed] to make an American lake out of the Pacific Ocean” (Lattimore, 1945, p. 
313). Although, this may have been set in the past, it still resonates with the intent that 
the US wants to retain its status as a dominant power in the Pacific region. Historically, 
critics queried this same motive by the US motives asking “by what authority [US] claim 
the right to do so”, (Lattimore, 1945, p. 313). Interestingly, some powers, as Lattimore 
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noted, were concerned about the US’s relationship and its “claims” when other 
“nations” such as Britain and France also had “interests” in the Pacific, (Lattimore, 
1945, p. 313). Based on Lattimore’s observation, could the US fit the criteria of a 
hegemon in the SP region then? After all America had assumed authority and claimed 
its right for the loss of lives and cost of setting up naval bases in strategic locations in 
the Pacific region which it built on “island territories of Allied Nations”? (Lattimore, 
1945, p. 313).  
 
Fast-track this scene to this 2nd quarter of the 21st Century, a similar strategy is being 
played out only this time it is not the Soviet Union that the US is keeping its eyes on, 
it is the PRC. With the “Asia-Pacific pivot”, (Ratuva, 2014, p. 414), announced during 
President Obama’s administration, reaffirmed and saw the upsurge of US engagement 
in the Pacific. Ratuva affirmed this was the US response through its “broad strategy to 
‘rebalance’ power in the Asia-Pacific region in response to Chinese economic, political 
and military interests”4, (Ratuva, 2014, p. 414).  
The US became the “superordinate” in the SPR, however, this has shifted with China’s 
influence and emergence as a new power in the region. Whilst, it appeared that the 
imperial competition was truly over within the Pacific region, on another level, a much 
more dangerous new direction had surfaced, “The superpowers are on the road 
toward nuclear war”, (Hayes, et al., 1986, p. ix).  It was during this period that the 
Pacific earned its name the “American Lake”, (Hayes, et al., 1986). Perhaps Hayes’ 
study needs further analysis, in particular, his thoughts on the switch in “superpowers 
military strategy [which] make it as likely that World War III could break out in the 
Pacific”, (Hayes, et al., 1986, p. ix). At the time The South Pacific, as part of the Pacific 
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scene, faced increased threat of a nuclear war. Notably, “it was in the Pacific, not in 
Europe, that the first atomic bomb was exploded in war”, (Hayes, et al., 1986, p. 1). It 
is evident that the Pacific had become dangerously embroiled as a target ground for 
“superpower nuclear arms race”, (Hayes, et al., 1986, p. 4). NZ as a signatory to the 
ANZUS Treaty,   was suspended from ANZUS in 1986, due to its part in initiating a 
nuclear-free zone in its territorial waters. NZ promoted a nuclear-free Pacific and had 
banned US ships into NZ which meant a souring of relations between NZ- US relations. 
The upside to this, thanks to NZ for ensuring a nuclear-free Pacific. The ban was lifted 
by United States, after twenty six (26) years as announced by its US Secretary of 
Defence, Leon Panetta during her visit to New Zealand in September, 2012. Defense 
relations between the two countries improved and reinforced security relations noted 
in the “2010 NZ White Paper”, (NZGovernment, 2010). Meanwhile, the US-China 
rivalry are obvious today in the SPR.  
 
To align with a state with superordinate power gives a form of stability to the region. It 
has the ability to engage and develop strategies that promote “hegemonic relations 
among rational nation-actors”, (Alt, et al., 1988, p. 445).  The powerful actor has the 
capacity to “effect distributional outcome in situation where actors compete over 
shares at the same time they cooperate to produce a good”, (Alt, et al., 1988, p. 445). 
This scenario gives the powerful actor legitimacy to attain the top level of almost 
absolute power and be declared a hegemon and have strong connections to regimes. 
In further examining the conduct of superpowers such as US and China, the concept 
of hegemony and power component are further emphasised. The US undoubtedly, 
possessed “structural characteristics”, (Nolte, 2010, p. 889). It wields material and 
economic power with a degree of ferocity. The swing of the “American warfighting 
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strategy and foreign policy have heightened the nuclear danger in the Pacific”, (Hayes, 
et al., 1986, p. 4).  
 
This aspect is evident in the case of East Asia, the US was not “treated as an extra-
regional actor”, (Goh, 2008, p. 353).  Furthermore, deeply embedded within the SPR, 
lies support for the US as a Western superpower. This is evident from the ANZUS 
Pact that binds the two countries together as well as ongoing defense and security 
arrangements with Australia in the contemporary period. (AustralianGovernment, 
1951). The West means shared history, mutual understanding, common language, 
common regional allies such as Australia and NZ in the SPR. Hayes reiterated the US  
view that, “Allies not only host forward-deployed American forces; they also provide 
political legitimacy for the US military role in the region”, (Hayes, et al., 1986, p. 4).  At 
the time according to Hayes, the “American military strength”, (Hayes, et al., 1986, p. 
4) meant it brought with it “stability”.  Goh endorsed similar sentiments and affirmed 
that the US gave stability to East Asia region in the contemporary period.   
 
In contrast, Ratuva is of the view that the “geopolitical dynamics has consequently 
stretched the ontological boundaries of ‘our sea’ to include the United States and 
China who now see themselves as an inseparable ‘part’ of the Pacific”, (Ratuva, 2014, 
p. 409). This does highlight the debate about who is the hyper-power in the region? Is 
it China or the U.S.? This forces one to deliberate on the question of power and 
hegemony in the SPR during the contemporary period. At this point, it compels one to 
revisit the Cold War era when the Soviet Union was viewed as the main threat at the 
time. The scenario appears to replicate the other, only this time there is a change of 
hyper-power actors involved.  
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However, with the shift towards China as a great power more diplomatic engagement 
has surfaced.  Whilst the ‘American Lake’ book exposes a hard core realist have 
relevant during the period being written about, it gives readers an insight into the US 
approach which is distinctive of its military prowess. It also gives a clue as to how the 
US acted during that era. Furthermore, the fierceness of US’s military intent is palpable 
when attempting to extrapolate relevant information from the ‘American Lake’ book, 
which to a degree borders on power, competition, greed and domination. In one of the 
pieces the article cites the “New Militarist” (Hayes, et al., 1986, p. 4) stating, “American 
diplomacy and economic influence rest on military muscle”, (Hayes, et al., 1986, p. 4). 
This is further affirmed by a comment made by a senior naval officer who had said, 
“Nothing below clear superiority will suffice”, (Hayes, et al., 1986, p. 6).  
 
Yang, in his analysis of China, as being a possible hegemon in the SPR, remains 
adamant that “despite China’s growing presence in the region, it is still a relatively 
minor player in the region’s institutions compared to the long-dominant Western 
powers”, (Yang, 2009, p. 152). In his views, China still requires to build its “capability” 
in order to be able to take the lead role “or control the transnational consensus 
formation” in the SPR. He uses the example of China as guest and not a member 
within the PIF, initially founded by the British administration with membership 
comprising of island states and NZ and Australia. Other SPR bodies do not include 
China as a member. China sees this as a disadvantage. China also views Australia 
and NZ as committed powers within SPR, geographically, they are part of this region 
and this is interpreted to indicate that “Beijing’s policy options in the South Pacific are 
[further] limited”, (Yang, 2009, p. 152). 
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Interestingly, Dr. Marc Lanteigne, an expert in the Asia-Pacific Security Complex 
affirms, while “China expands its foreign policy interests and strategic power further 
into the Pacific Ocean, a division is developing between Beijing’s policies in the 
western Pacific”, (Lanteigne, 2012, p. 21). The power play of political might of two 
great powers and their foreign policies in the region mirror and/or replicate what 
transpired during post World War II period through to pre and post-Cold War era. 
China’s entry into the South Pacific is timely as, it seems, while the US is heavily 
engaged in the European Ukraine crisis and its effort to curb war on terror in the Middle 
East, China has deepened its engagement in the South Pacific. China’s sees the role 
played in the region by NZ and Australia as an “extension”, (Lanteigne, 2012, p. 21) 
of the US. Lanteigne affirmed China enlarged its influence in the region through its 
“soft aid program” and has gained a place of prominence amongst the 14 independent 
island states from within the sub-region of Melanesia, Polynesia but not as much in 
Micronesia where the US has strong influence. 
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4.1.1 Table 1: Donor Countries Providing Aid to South Pacific Countries. 
Donor States Population GDP 2012 US$ Trillion 
AID in 
US$ 
Million 
ODA 
2012 Geo-Landmass 
Military 
Defense 2013 
US$ 
GDP  
US$ Trillion 
PPP 2014 
Nuclear 
Warhead 
Regime Embassies   
Diplomatic 
Relations 
United 
States 
319.0 m 16.163200 168 9.16 m. sq km 640 b.  17.42 7,300 Const. Dem. 157 
China 1.370 b 8.229490030100 
688.78*
  
9.3 m. sq km 188 b.  17.62 250  Communist  22 
United 
Kingdom 
64.07 m 2.614946487603  n/a 241, 930.00 57 b.  2.549 225 Const. Monarc  76 
New 
Zealand 
4.543 m 0.171461397176 b. 228 268, 021 sq km 2634 m. NZ$  158.9 b. 0 Parl. Dem  30 
Australia 23.18 m 1.534425905763 1147 7. 62 m. sq km 
25715 m. 
AUD$  
1.095 0 Fed.Dem.Par  unlisted 
France 66.20 m 2.686722589270 136 547, 561 sq km 61.200 b.  2.581 300 Republic   unlisted 
European 
Union 
Supra-State 
 503 m 17.251951436183 86 139, 988.sq km $300 b.  18.01 n/a  Supra-State  unlisted 
Japan 126.1 m 5.954476603962 128 374, 744 sq km 48.6 b.  4.751 0 Par. Fed. Rep  111 
India 1.267 b 1.858744737181  n/a 2.97 m. sq km 47.4 b.  7.376 90-110 Fed. Republic  68 
Rep. Korea 50.34 m 1.222807167489  n/a  98, 190 sq km 33.9 b.  1.781 0 Republic  30 
Indonesia 252.8 m 0.876719347689 b. 
 n/a  
1, 811, 570.00 
87500 b. 
rupiah  
2.676 0 Republic  41 
Qatar 2.268 m 0.190289829681 b. 
 n/a  
11, 610.00 
6831 m.riyals 
[2010] 
320.5 b.  0 Emirate  4 
Russian Fed 141.0 m 0.169396055591 b. 
 n/a  
17m. sq km 
2796 b. 
roubles  
3.565 8,000 Federal  27 
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4.1.2 Table 2: South Pacific Countries Receiving Aid. 
 SPR- Recipients 
Population
  
GDP 2012 US b/m. 
ODA-Rcvd 
USD 
million 
 2012 
Geo-Landmass  
Military 
Defense  
 GDP  
US$ Billion 
PPP 2014 
 Nuclear  Regime Type 
Embassies   
Diplomatic 
Relations 
PNG 7.476 m $15.29 b. 665 452, 860 sq km 107 m. dollars 18.07 n/a Const. P.Dem  2 
Fiji 887,00 $3.855 b. 107 18, 270 sq km 187 m. kina 7.293  n/a Republic  11 
Vanuatu 258, 000 $828.2 m. 101 12, 200 sq km n/a 665.7 m. n/a Par. Rep  unlisted 
Tonga 106,000 $466.3 m. 78 720 sq km n/a 500 m. n/a Con. Mon unlisted 
Samoa 192,000 $801.9 m. 121 2, 934 sq km n/a 994 m.  n/a Parl. Dem unlisted 
Solomon Is 573,000 $1.096 b. 305 27, 990 sq km n/a 1.09 n/a Parl. Rep unlisted 
Wallis & Futuna  15, 500  $12, 640  120 274 sq km n/a 60 m. [2004] n/a Parl. Rep  unlisted 
FSM 104,000 $316.2 m. 115 718 sq km n/a  n/a n/a Const. Gov unlisted 
Marshall Is 53,000 $190.9 m. 76 180 sq km n/a 181 m. n/a Const. Gov  unlisted 
Kiribati 104,000 
$169.0 m. 
[2013] 
65 811 sq km 
n/a 
188 m. 
n/a 
Republic 
unlisted 
French Polynesia 280, 000 $3.448 b. 
High 
Inc.  
3, 660 sq km 
n/a 
7.15 [2012]  
n/a 
Parliament 
unlisted 
New Caledonia 263, 000 $2.682 b. 
High 
Inc. 
18, 575 sq km 
n/a 
11.1 
n/a 
Parl. Rep 
unlisted 
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4.1.3. Information about the Ranking Table 
Table 1 & Table 2 
This table shows defined perimeters to assist in exploring the question ‘is hegemony 
possible in the South Pacific’. There are some information that are not easily available 
in some of the countries and attempts made to find the closest figures. Some countries 
chosen may not be a member of the OECD countries.  
 
Aid has been used as the primary reference in effort to establish a premise for 
identifying which internal or external state may be the hegemon in the region. The US 
and China which featured throughout this paper both did not get to be the top donor 
states based on OECD Aid to the South Pacific Region.   Australia and New Zealand 
has been added as part of the donor countries even though both are geographically 
part of the SPR. The ranking table has identified that Australia ranks as the top donor 
in the region while China ranks second. Could Australia be the hegemon in the region? 
Explanation of Parameters 
Donor States & South Pacific Region (SPR).  
Details list of Donor States in SPR were selected based on these factors; 
 Influence 
 Interests 
 Level of Aid & Development  
 Diplomacy 
 Economic & Trade 
 Security & Defense – includes Military, Naval 
Actual boundaries 
 Population 
 GDP based on [Actual] GDP per capita, PPP (current international $) 
 AID 
 Geography – Landmass 
 Security/Defense-Military Spending 
 Economy – expressed in GDP US dollars of Purchasing Power Parity to ascertain 
relative gain of different currencies. 
 Technology- Nuclear Energy 
 Regime Type 
 Diplomatic relations  
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Table 2 
As a point of interest, I have included the recipient states in the SPR and which covers 
small island states in the three sub-region; Melanesia, Polynesia, Micronesia. 14 of 
these states have signed diplomatic agreement with China. Again efforts have been 
made to fill in the columns as best as it could be.  
The two tables; Table 1 and Table 2 clearly distinguishes the external powers or 
donors to SPR Aid recipients. Other factors such as populations and Defense/Military 
spending are also interesting benchmark. 
 
 
5.0     Conclusion 
To construct a sound narrative of the South Pacific Region and determine if hegemony 
is possible I have inferred that neither the US nor China can be the hegemon in the 
region at this point in time. It is possible to have a hegemon in the region and this may 
be feasible to ascertain in the near future. Drawing on the meaning of the word 
‘hegemony’ or “hegemonia or Ήγεμωv, [or] hegemon” from Homer’s version in Iliad 
and noted in Wilkinson (2008, p. 120), to be a hegemon literally means ‘supreme’ or 
supremacy’. However, the concept of hegemony has varied over time and so have its 
interpretations. From the international relations perspectives, as Mosher (n.d) 
affirmed, it means “a single pole or axis or power” and it points toward a leading state 
or predominantly, the biggest influence of one state over other states.    
 
Whilst Ratuva (2014, p. 418) had affirmed that both the US and China are “hegemonic 
states” in the Pacific, the outcome of the ranking analysis designed for this paper 
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reveals a different outcome for the SPR. A clear distinction of the Pacific as a large 
region, within which sits the SPR needs to be made clear from the outset to avoid 
confusion. Undoubtly, US and China are key players in the region. This is evident from 
development programs and diplomatic ties they each have with SPR.  There is an 
evolving geopolitical power play in the SPR, which Ratuva indicated, “may have 
pushed the precincts noted in “Hau’ofa’s ‘our seas’ as the two hegemonic states, the 
Unites States and China, stake their claims as Pacific powers”, (Ratuva, 2014, p. 418). 
This is creating a complex situation in the region as the various layers of rivalry and 
interactions are occurring today. 
 
The SPR is an oceanic region which has number of island sovereign states within the 
sub-region and includes Australia and New Zealand. The geopolitical nature of the 
region in the contemporary sense presents a different architecture when compared to 
the larger picture of the Pacific theatre or American Lake in the 20th to the early 21st 
century.  The evolving nature of regional and global politics has impacted a great deal 
on the development and changes occurring in the region. This means small sovereign 
island states, small actors, as they may be are adding to the complexities of power 
play as each aligns and has diplomatic relations with big powers of its choice. China 
has signed diplomatic ties with fourteen island states which is a first in the region. This 
option was never available during the era of the American Lake when US was called 
the hegemon in the Pacific with the SPR factored in to this picture. Alternatively, US 
has extended its Security and Defense arrangement with Australia by setting up 
outposts in specific areas. It has signed Security agreements with New Zealand. 
China’s emergence and deepening involvement resulting from the signing of 
diplomatic ties with fourteen island states re-ignited the interests of the traditional 
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Western Powers. The situation has presented itself as a complex one with multi-level 
dimensions and signals the shifting dynamics of powers within the region.  
 
Based on the table ranking, using Aid as the primary parameters, US is ranked as 
fourth while China   rank as number two on the donor country table for the SPR. It is 
Australia that gives the most Aid in the region and followed by China. Australia’s 
position is quitre strong, considering it is the top donor state in Aid within the region 
and possesses defense/security and material capability aided by the US. It has the 
largest population and landmass. However, it falls short of being the hegemon.  A 
hegemonic power brings with it stability in the region and possess unequivocal 
hierarchy of power and an unchallenged dominant or hegemonic power”, (Gilpin, 1988, 
p. 592). Gilpin asserts, that a challenge to this stability can trigger bigger problems 
between the two states. According to Gilpin, this creates instability or an “unstable 
system” which relates to “economic, technological, and other changes” that erode “the 
international hierarchy” thus challenging “the position of the hegemonic state”, (Gilpin, 
1988, p. 592).  
 
The geo-political nature in SPR continues to evolve as the dynamic of actors continue 
to interact at all levels. Most importantly, the cooperation and collaboration of these 
actors at the highest level of governance in the region are crucial for the superordinate 
power to become a hegemon.  The two tables; 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 used indicates ‘Donor 
Countries Providing Aid to South Pacific Countries’, and features ‘Recipient Pacific 
Island sovereign states’. The four states; Australia, China, New Zealand, United States 
are identified as top donors in the region. This means they each contribute significantly 
in various ways towards development in the region be it aid, security and economically. 
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Australia, unlike China, which has signed diplomatic ties with fourteen of the Pacific 
Island states. There is no record of the US signing agreement with the fourteen island 
states. US, however, still ranks as the top in material wealth and Security/Defense 
capabilities and is already a hegemon in East Asia as Goh indicated.  
 
It is evident that China views the US as superordinate power however, this does not 
deter China from continuing to seek strong economic ties with states in the SPR 
despite its ongoing diplomatic competition with Taiwan. It will be interesting to gauge, 
if these small island states opt for China when casting their United Nation votes. The 
US has enjoyed the hegemon status in the Asia region, which China appears poised 
to offset. However, Asian scholars such as Yang and Yu and Goh do acknowledge 
that whilst China is rising in its economic growth and its plan to advance its blue water 
maritime naval strategy, it is still a long way off. Yang indicated, the claim that “China 
is on its way to replace the West led by the US and to dominate the South Pacific is 
flawed”, (Yang, 2009, p. 154).  
 
On a final note, it is crucial to mention for the small island sovereign states in the SPR, 
the influences and interests by external states, some which are non-traditional have 
meant newer opportunities, as the case with China. This was not the case during the 
American Lake era when the US was the dominant state and hegemon in the South 
Pacific Region. This is now shifting. The modern day perspectives of hegemon has 
also evolved over time. This can be noted in Goh’s analysis on the social component 
of hegemony which also resonates with Marsella’s theory of the social and cultural 
aspect. Australia and NZ, as donor countries and part of SPR enjoy a different status 
when compared to the small island states in the same region, which are recipients and 
dependent on Aid. It is no doubt, that the choices are with the smaller island states, 
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as to which superordinate powers and/or other powers, it wishes to align with. In return, 
these powers get to influence and implement changes which ultimately impact the 
smaller states’ national policies and structures. Deeper interactions and involvement 
in the SPR at several layers are crucial. Powers that have material capabilities, does 
add to the security in the region, however, this factor appears to have shifted, as the 
focus in defining hegemon has now embraced a much wider context.   
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